REPRESENTATIVE MATTERS
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
City of Chicago v. Fulton, U.S., 141 S. Ct. 585 (2021)
HOLDINGS: [1]-In a case in which a city impounded each respondent's vehicle for failure to pay fines for motor vehicle infractions, and each respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, the Supreme Court held only that mere retention of estate property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not violate the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C.S. § 362(a)(3). Reading § 362(a)(3) to cover mere retention of property, as respondents advocated, would create at least two serious problems. First, it would render the central command of 11 U.S.C.S. § 542 largely superfluous even though § 542 appears on its face to be the governing provision. Second, respondents' reading would render the commands of § 362(a)(3) and § 542 contradictory. It would be an odd construction of § 362(a)(3) to require a creditor to do immediately what § 542 specifically excuses.
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT
First Midwest Bank v. Cobo, 2018 IL 123038
HOLDINGS: [1]-To determine whether two lawsuits asserted the same cause of action for purposes of the single refiling rule of 735 ILCS 5/13-217 (1994), the transactional test for identity of cause of action applied, treating separate claims as the same cause of action if they arose from a single group of operative facts; [2]-Under the transactional test, a lender's breach of promissory note lawsuit asserted the same cause of action as a prior foreclosure complaint that was based on the same default because the prior foreclosure complaint specifically requested a deficiency judgment, which was optional under 735 ILCS 5/15-1504(f) and, as provided in 735 ILCS 5/15-1511 (2016), was a right that was not affected by foreclosure; [3]-The single refiling rule was distinct from res judicata and therefore did not require that the prior lawsuit have reached a final adjudication on the merits.
ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT
Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Cortez, 2020 IL App (1st) 192234-B
HOLDINGS: [1]-In a mortgage foreclosure action, where the deed conveying title to the property was executed following the confirmation of the foreclosure sale and recorded by the Cook County Recorder of Deeds, pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/15-1509(c), the court was precluded from vacating the order approving the sale as it pertained to defendant's loan modification argument; [2]-While neither party had presented competent evidence as to the exact amount of funds paid by defendant and plaintiff's allocation of those funds, there was sufficient evidence in the record to warrant a hearing regarding the proper amount of the surplus. Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the circuit court for the limited purpose of conducting a hearing regarding the issue of the amount of the surplus.
Associates Asset Management, LLC v. Cruz, 2019 IL App (1st) 182678
HOLDINGS: [1]-The lender failed to give the required notice to the borrower before declaring default and accelerating the promissory note because notice was a contractual condition precedent to default, the note required the lender to give a preacceleration notice, all four of the lender's demand letters were severely deficient in substance as the lender failed to provide most of the information required under the contract, and the lender's complaint was deficient as a notice of default and acceleration since it neither advised the borrower of the overdue payment amount nor gave a grace period to pay that amount, but sought the full accelerated balance from him. The lender's failure to provide the borrower with the contractually required notices prior to default and acceleration divested the lender of the right to file the breach of contract action.
First Midwest Bank v. Cobo, 2017 IL App (1st) 170872
HOLDINGS: [1]-A grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on its complaint for breach of contract and unjust enrichment was improper because, for purposes of res judicata, the same set of operative facts gave rise to the causes of action in the foreclosure complaint and the breach of note complaint. The relevant consideration for purposes of 735 ILCS 5/13-217 (1994) was whether both claims arose from a single group of operative facts, regardless of whether they asserted different theories of relief, and that was satisfied; [2]-Plaintiff's breach of contract action represented an improper second refiling in violation of § 13-217, and the trial court should have granted defendants' motion to dismiss that count.
Banco Popular North America v. Gizynski, 2015 IL App (1st) 142871
HOLDINGS: [1] Defendant did not waive the forfeiture issue by opting not to file an interlocutory appeal; [2] The court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff because the property was used as residential under 735 ILCS 5/15-1219 (2010) and the required notice was not given, and defendant was entitled to the protections provided to mortgagors of residential real estate under 735 ILCS 5/15-1502.5 (2010).
BANKRUPTCY COURT
In re Dancel, No. 18 BK 01399, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 362 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2019)
HOLDINGS: [1]-Where it was undisputed that creditor was a party to the foreclosure proceeding, and that it appeared creditor had notice of the motion for entry of a consent judgment, creditor was bound by the terms of the consent judgment, with the effect that its claim was extinguished pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/15-1509(c).
